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I. INTRODUCTION
¶1

Rwanda is widely considered a poster child for post conflict development. Since
the 1994 genocide, in which an estimated 800,000 people lost their lives,1 the country has
gone through a rapid process of socio-economic development. In the last 10 years,
Rwanda’s GDP growth has averaged 7.4 %, nearly double the regional average.2 Rwanda
is the only country in Sub-Saharan Africa that is on track to meet its health related
millennium development goals3 and the only country in the world where women hold a
majority of seats in the national legislature.4 When it comes to the general markers of a
free and democratic society, such as a free press and a free and open election process,
however, Rwanda scores considerably lower. Rwanda ranks 161st of 179 in Reporters
Without Borders’ 2013 World Press Freedom Index5 and Freedom House has said in its
2013 country report that “Rwanda is not an electoral democracy” as the ruling party, the
Rwandan Patriotic Front, maintains tight control of elections.6 This case study seeks to
* Senior Legal Counsel at the Media Legal Defence Initiative (MLDI). For more information, see
www.mediadefence.org. The author was part of the legal team that represented Agnès Uwimana-Nkusi and
Saidati Mukakibibi before the Supreme Court of Rwanda and is currently part of the legal team
representing the journalists in their case before the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of
MLDI. The author would like to thank Iain Edwards, Peter Noorlander and Carina Tertsakian for their
helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article. The author would also like to thank Max Bernstein for
his help preparing this paper for publication and Shaun Hambly for his assistance with preparatory
research.
1 Rwanda: How The Genocide Happened, BBC News (May 7, 2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/worldafrica-13431486.
2 Rwanda Country Data, The World Bank, http://www.data.worldbank.org/country/rwanda.
3 Paul E. Farmer, Reduced Premature Mortality in Rwanda: lessons from success, BMJ (Jan. 24, 2013),
www.bmj.com/content/346/bmj.f534.
4 Women in National Parliaments, Inter-Parliamentary Union, (Jan. 1, 2013), http://www.ipu.org/wmne/classif.htm. The Rwandan Constitution guarantees seats for women in the Parliament. Const. of the
Republic of Rwanda, May 26, 2003, art. 9 (Rwanda) [hereinafter The Constitution] (“The State of Rwanda
commits itself to conform to the following fundamental principles and to promote and enforce the respect
thereof: [. . .] equality of all Rwandans and between women and men reflected by ensuring that women are
granted at least thirty per cent of posts in decision making organs.”).
5 World Press Freedom Index 2013, Reporters Without Borders, http://www.en.rsf.org/press-freedomindex-2013,1054.html.
6 Freedom in the World: Rwanda, Freedom House, http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedomworld/2013.rwanda.
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address a specific aspect of Rwanda’s oppressive political climate: the use of criminal
prosecutions under the country’s genocide denial laws to restrict free expression.
Rwanda has enacted a number of laws proscribing “genocide ideology”, “genocide
minimisation” and “negationism.”7 These laws are ostensibly intended to prevent a
repetition of the events of 1994. The existence of such laws in Rwanda is not unique:
similar legislation exists in a number of European countries8 and at the level of the
European Union.9 What makes Rwanda’s laws of interest is the manner in which these
laws have been used to restrict a free and open debate on matters of public interest in the
country and especially the restrictive effect the laws have had on free speech in the
media.
This article will focus on a recent case in which one of the genocide denial laws10
was used in the prosecution of two female Rwandan journalists. The conviction and
sentence to 10 years’ imprisonment of one of the journalists for having allegedly
minimized the genocide in an article published in a biweekly Kinyarwanda-language
newspaper was quashed on appeal by the Supreme Court of Rwanda in April 2012.11 In
its judgment, the Court held that article 4 of the Law Repressing the Crime of Genocide,
Crimes against Humanity and War Crimes12 (the “2003 Law”), under which the genocide
minimization charges were brought, does not clearly explain what constitutes “genocide
minimisation”.13 This appears to be a clear signal that at least this provision of the 2003
Law is in violation of Rwanda’s obligations under international law to provide for
sufficiently precise legislation to curtail free speech. This obligation also follows from
The Constitution, supra note 4; Law No. 33bis/2003, Repressing the Crime of Genocide, Crimes Against
Humanity and War Crimes, art. 9, Official Gazette of Rwanda, Nov. 1, 2003 [hereinafter the 2003 Law];
Law No. 18/2008, Relating to the Punishment of the Crime of Genocide Ideology, Official Gazette of
Rwanda, Oct. 15, 2008 [hereinafter the 2008 Law].
8 See, e.g., Verbotsgesetz 1947 [National Socialism Prohibition Law] (amended in 1992) (Austria); Loi
tendant à réprimer la négation, la minimisation, la justification ou l'approbation du génocide commis par le
régime national-socialiste allemand pendant la seconde guerre mondiale [Negationism Law] of Mar. 30,
1995, June 25, 1999 (Belg.); Law Against Support and Dissemination of Movements Oppressing Human
Rights and Freedoms (2001) (Czech); La Loi 90-615 du 13 Juillet 1990 tendant à réprimer tout
acte raciste, antisémite ou xenophobe [Law No. 90-615 to Repress Acts of Racism, Anti-Semitism and
Xenophobia], July 13, 1990 (Fr.); Strafprozessordnung [StPO] [Code of Criminal Procedure], Apr. 7, 1987,
as amended, § 130 (Ger.); 2005, Büntetı Törvénykönyv (Article 269/C of the Criminal Code) (Hung.);
Denial of Holocaust Law, 5746-1986 (Isr.); Code Criminal [StGB] § 283 (Liech.); 170 straipsnis. Viešas
pritarimas tarptautiniams nusikaltimams, SSRS ar nacistin÷s Vokietijos nusikaltimams Lietuvos
Respublikai ar jos gyventojams, jų neigimas ar šiurkštus menkinimas [Law 170(2) Publicly Condoning
International Crimes, Crimes of the USSR or Nazi Germany Against the Republic of Lithuania and Her
Inhabitants, Denial or Belittling of such Crimes] (Lith.); Code Criminal, art. 457-3 (Lux.); Ustawa z dnia
18 grudnia 1998 r. o Instytucie Pamięci Narodowej — Komisji Ścigania Zbrodni przeciwko Narodowi
Polskiemu [Act of 18 December 1998 on the Institute of National Remembrance — Commission for
Prosecution of Crimes against the Polish Nation] (Pol.); Código Penal [Criminal Code], art. 240 (Port.);
OrdonanŃa de urgenŃă a Guvernului nr. 31/2002 [Emergency Ordinance No. 31 of Mar. 13, 2002] (Rom.);
Zivilgesetzbuch [Criminal Code], art. 261 (Switz.).
9 Council Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA, Combating Racism and Xenophobia, 2008 O.J. (L328) 6.12
(which came into effect in 2008).
10 The 2003 Law, supra note 7.
11 Le Ministère Public v. Uwimana Nkusi and Mukakibibi, Case No. RPA 0061/11/CS (S.C. Apr. 4, 2012)
(Rwanda) (unpublished opinion on file with author) [hereinafter the 2012 Judgment].
12 The 2003 Law, supra note 7.
13 The 2012 Judgment, supra note 11, ¶ 48.
7
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Rwanda’s Constitution, which declares that Rwanda’s obligations under international law
trump its national laws.14
While precise statistics are difficult to obtain, it is clear that over the past years a
great number of cases related to “genocide ideology” and “genocide revisionism” have
been brought in Rwanda, possibly approaching 2,000.15 Some of these cases were
brought even before the relevant legislation had been enacted.16 Given the frequent
prosecutions related to this particular crime, which is codified under a law that lacks
precision, one might have expected that an explicit statement by the country’s highest
court regarding the law’s vague provisions would have had some effect. However, in the
months following the Supreme Court judgment, matters have only become less
transparent. Rather than taking a cue from the Supreme Court’s focus on the element of
intent, the public prosecutor in the district of Muhanga decided to prosecute a radio
presenter on grounds of genocide denial for misspeaking while reading the news.17 To
complicate matters further, the Supreme Court itself, in an interim judgment in the
prosecution of opposition politician Victoire Ingabire, stated that the 2008 Law Related
to the Punishment of Genocide Ideology (the “2008 Law”)18 was not in violation of
Rwanda’s Constitution,19 a ruling seemingly inconsistent with its earlier findings in April
2012.
This has led to even greater uncertainty as to what the crime of “genocide denial”
or “genocide minimisation” entails. One particular point of concern is that the current
state of affairs leaves open the possibility for almost anyone to exploit these laws to their
advantage. A reform process of the genocide denial laws was set in motion in 2010 by the
National Law Reform Commission.20 The reform effort gained traction in July 2013 with
the National Assembly passing a draft revision of the 2008 Law, which was passed by a
joint National Assembly and Senate committee in August, just before the closure of
Parliament.21 Despite the praise the 2013 Law received from the national press,22 the

The Constitution, supra note 4, art. 190.
Amnesty Int’l, Safer to Stay Silent: The Chilling Effect of Rwanda's Laws on 'Genocide Ideology' and
'Sectarianism' (2010), http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AFR47/005/2010 [hereinafter Safer to Stay
Silent]. The report cites government statistics showing the “genocide ideology” cases before courts of first
instance numbered 792 in 2007, 618 in 2008, and 435 in 2009. The government statistics do not specify the
law under which charges were brought, nor do they provide data on convictions, acquittals, and sentences.
The Genocide in Rwanda: The Difficulty of Trying to Stop it from Happening Ever Again, The Economist,
(Apr. 8, 2009), http://www.economist.com/node/13447279.
16 Safer to Stay Silent, supra note 15, at 19.
17Le Ministere Public v. Habarugira, Judgment No. CE 30/07/2012 (Muhanga First Instance Ct. Aug. 22,
2012) (unpublished opinion on file with author).
18 The 2008 Law, supra note 7.
19 Le Ministère Public v. Ingabire, Judgment No. RP 0081-0110/10/HC/KIG (High Ct. of Kigali Oct. 20
2012) [hereinafter the Ingabire Judgment].
20 Rwanda: Senate Endorses Law Reform Commission, All Africa (Nov. 11, 2009),
http://www.allafrica.com/stories/200911110004.html ("The Commission will be in charge of scrutinizing
laws to avail room for proposals to concerned authorities that can amend and ratify the laws,” quotes a
parliamentary statement).
21 The National Assembly passed the 2013 bill on Genocide Ideology and Related Offences on July 15,
2013. The bill passed the Senate on August 13, 2013 (copy of the law on file with the author).
22 James Karuhanga, MPs Discuss Evictions of Rwandans, The New Times, (Aug. 14, 2013),
http://www.newtimes.co.rw/news/index.php?a=69529&i=15449.
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revisions the law brings do not seem adequate to counter the aforementioned concerns,23
which leaves open the question if this process should be given further impetus, and what
measures can be taken in the meantime to prevent unjustified prosecutions.
This article begins with a brief description of the genocide denial laws and their
legislative history in Section II, followed in Section III by a discussion of the case against
the two female Rwandan journalists, Agnès Uwimana-Nkusi and Saidati Mukakibibi, and
the resulting Supreme Court judgment. Section IV offers reflections on the Supreme
Court’s 2012 ruling and its aftermath, and Section V discusses possible avenues of
reform. Section VI highlights developments since the Supreme Court ruling and Section
VII concludes by raising the question whether the current situation is sustainable.
II. RWANDA’S GENOCIDE DENIAL LAWS

¶7

¶8

In 2003 and 2008, Rwanda passed laws nominally aimed at curbing the crimes of
genocide and genocide ideology respectively. The 2003 law went beyond the
Parliament’s stated intention of codifying international commitments. The law made it
criminal to minimize, negate, or justify the genocide. The 2008 law outlines the crime of
genocide ideology. Both laws have been criticized for their vague terminology, which
fails to describe in precise terms what behavior does and does not incur criminal liability.
Rwanda’s genocide denial laws cannot be isolated from their historical backdrop;
the killing in 1994 of an estimated 800,000 Tutsi and so-called “moderate” Hutu has cast
a long shadow that can still be sensed in Rwanda today. The genocide took place
alongside the armed conflict between the Rwandan government forces and the Rwandan
Patriotic Front (RPF), a conflict that lasted from October 1990 until July 1994.24 To
understand the context in which the genocide ideology laws came into existence, it is
important to note the crucial role the media played in the 1994 genocide, both before and
during the killings. A 2009 study by the Harvard Kennedy School of Government
estimates that 10% of the perpetrators, an estimated 51,000 people, participated in the
violence as a direct result of propaganda transmitted by the infamous Radio Télévision
Libre des Mille Collines.25 Formal judicial recognition of the role of the media in the
killings had already come in 2003, in the so-called “Media Trial,” when the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda convicted Ferdinand Nahimana and Jean Bosco
Barayagwiza, who were in charge of Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines, and
Hassan Ngeze, the director and editor of the newspaper Kangura, of genocide, incitement
to genocide, and crimes against humanity.26 The loss of faith in the media due to the

Human Rights Watch has welcomed some amendments in the draft laws proposed in the last two years,
including reductions in sentences and a more precise definition of some offenses, but has criticized the
retention of vague language which the organization calls “ripe for abuse.” Hum. Rts. Watch, World Report
2012: Rwanda (2012), http://www.hrw.org/world-report-2012/world-report-2012-rwanda.
24 For an extensive discussion of the abuses committed by the parties to the Rwandan Civil War, see
Organization for African Unity, Rwanda: The Preventable Genocide (2000),
http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/4d1da8752.pdf.
25 David Yanagizawa-Drott, Propaganda and Conflict (2009),
http://www.hks.harvard.edu/fs/dyanagi/Research/RwandaDYD.pdf.
26 Prosecutor v. Nahima, Barayagwiza, & Ngeze, Case No. ICTR-99-52-T, Judgment and Sentence, (Int'l
Crim. Trib. for Rwanda Dec. 3, 2003).

23
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culpability of key media outlets has led to an environment conducive to strict regulation
of freedom of expression.27
¶9
After the genocide, as part of an effort to demarcate itself from the policies of its
predecessor and prevent a recurrence of ethnic violence, the new Rwandan government
encouraged Rwandans to abandon their ethnic affiliation by means of speeches and the
establishment of a special commission.28 It also sought to root its new vision of an
ethnicity-neutral state in law. The first step was Law No. 47/2001 on Sectarianism,29 a
2001 law that proscribed acts of discrimination and “sectarianism” by prohibiting “the
use of any speech, written statement or action that divides people, that is likely to spark
conflicts among people, or that causes an uprising which might degenerate into strife
among people based on discrimination.”30 The law has led to a considerable restriction of
expression, going as far as a de facto criminalization of the use of the words “Hutu” or
“Tutsi,” the two predominant ethnic identities in Rwanda.31
¶10
Two years later the effort to reduce ethnic “divisions” was revisited. The
Constitution of Rwanda, which was enacted in 2003, lists the fighting of “genocide
ideology” as an explicit goal in its preambular paragraphs and “fundamental principles.”32
The Constitution’s Preamble states that the People of Rwanda are “resolved to fight the
ideology of genocide and all its manifestations and to eradicate ethnic, regional and any
other form of divisions,” while article 9, part of the chapter on “Fundamental Principles,”
states that:
The State of Rwanda commits itself to conform to the following
fundamental principles and to promote and enforce the respect thereof
1. fighting the ideology of genocide and all its manifestations;
2. eradication of ethnic, regional and other divisions and promotion of
national unity.
¶11
Article 13 of the Constitution states that “[r]evisionism, negationism and
trivialisation of genocide are punishable by the law”33 and article 33 says that the same
applies to “propagation of ethnic, regional, racial or discrimination or any other form of
division.”34 Succinct and decisive as these statements may seem, they do not make clear
what “genocide ideology” or “negationism” entails or what the implications are of the
“mission statement” outlined in the Constitution’s preamble.

Rwanda ranks 161 of 179 countries in the 2013 Reporters Without Borders’ World Press Freedom Index.
Reporters Without Borders, supra note 5. Independent of the 2003 and 2008 laws, Rwanda’s media
regulations have been criticized. The latest media law, Law N°02/2013 on regulating media, for example,
has been critiqued by the human rights group Article 19 for its lack of clarity, failure to protect sources,
content restrictions, and continuation of centralized control of media outlets.
28 Lars Waldorf, Revisiting Hotel Rwanda: Genocide Ideology, Reconciliation, and Rescuers, 11 J. of
Genocide Research 101, 103 (2009).
29 Law No. 47/2001, Instituting Punishment for the Offences of Discrimination and Sectarianism, Official
Gazette of Rwanda, Dec. 18, 2001 [hereinafter the 2001 Law].
30 Id. art. 1(2).
31 Waldorf, supra note 28, at 103.
32 The Constitution, supra note 4, Preamble, art. 9.
33 Id. art. 13.
34 Id. art. 33.

27
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The Constitution’s propensity to inhibit freedom of expression has been widely
condemned by numerous authors and NGOs35 and contradicts other provisions of the
Constitution that explicitly guarantee freedom of expression (see Section IV). Peter Uvin,
an expert on conflict and human rights in Africa who has published extensively on
Rwanda and Burundi, asserted at the time the Constitution was drafted that the effective
suppression of organized political dissent and the centralized control of the judiciary
“guaranteed a continuation of the current regime in power” and that limitations on free
speech provided “enormous opportunities for abuse.”36 A European Union mission team
warned that provisions of the Constitution “limit the freedoms of expression and
association, as well as party political activities.”37 These identified shortcomings have left
few constitutional barriers to laws impeding free speech.
¶13
The first law addressing genocide to follow the Constitution was Law No. 33
bis/2003 Repressing the Crime of Genocide, Crimes against Humanity and War Crimes.
It was adopted a few months after the Constitution in 2003.38 The 2003 Law was intended
to provide sanctions for crimes related to those listed in a number of international
conventions Rwanda became party to, including the 1948 Genocide Convention.39
However, the law goes much further than a mere prohibition of the crime of genocide:40
Article 4 creates a penalty of 10 to 20 years for any person who: will have publicly
shown, by his or her words, writings, images, or by any other means, that he or she has
negated the genocide committed, rudely minimised it or attempted to justify or approve
its grounds, or any person who will have hidden or destroyed its evidence. 41
¶14
This wording itself is very broad, covering an endless variety of imaginable acts.
Article 17(3) of the law casts a wider net still by making also unsuccessful attempts to
incite others to commit any crime under the law punishable as though the crime had
actually been committed.42 So not only is denying the genocide an offense, “incitement,
by way of speech, image or writing, to commit . . . such a crime, even where not followed
by an execution”43 is as well. However, it is not clear how incitement to deny the
genocide can be proven when the person allegedly incited did not eventually display any
signs of “genocide denial”. Nor is it clear what “rudely minimising” the genocide entails.
Even the judiciary has found the law difficult to interpret. One judge told Amnesty
See, e.g., Peter Uvin, Rwanda’s Draft Constitution: Some Personal Reflections On Democracy and
Conflict and the Role of the International Community (2003),
http://repositories.lib.utexas.edu/bitstream/handle/2152/5305/2601.pdf?sequence=1; Casey Dalporto,
Genocide Ideology Laws: Violations of Rwandan Peoples' 'Peoples' Rights'?, 20 Cardozo J. Int'l & Comp.
L. 875 (2012); Hum. Rts. Watch, Law and reality, Progress in Judicial Reform in Rwanda (2008),
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2008/rwanda0708/rwanda0708webwcover.pdf [hereinafter the Human Rights
Watch Report]. See also Filip Reyntjens, Rwanda, Ten Years On, 103 African Affairs 177 (2004).
36 Uvin, supra note 36, at 1, 5.
37 Reyntjens, supra note 36, at 185 (as translated from French by Rentjens).
38 The 2003 Law, supra note 7.
39 Rwanda acceded on Apr. 16, 1975.
40 The 2003 Law, supra note 7, art. 1.
41 Id. art. 4.
42 “Without prejudice to the provisions of the Penal Code relating to the attempt and criminal participation,
the following acts shall be punished by penalties provided for by this law: 1° an order, even where not
followed by an execution, to commit one of the crimes referred to by this law; 2° a proposal or an offer to
commit such a crime and the acceptance of such a proposal or offer.” Id. art 17.
43 Id.
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International that the definitions in the 2003 Law were “broad” and “not scientific,”
although he ultimately defended the law’s use.44 A retired judge complained of
difficulties in applying the law because of the abstract nature of the language used.45 This
underlines an important problem of the genocide denial laws: judges have been left with
broad discretion in implementing abstract concepts in an important piece of legislation.
This will be further highlighted by the case study discussed below.
¶15
The 2003 Law was critically received. Human Rights Watch criticized its passage
and reported that “[n]either the constitution nor the 2003 law provided specific
definitions of the terms ‘revisionism,’ ‘denial’ or ‘gross minimization.’” The report went
on to say “[w]hen asked to define ‘divisionism,’ not one judge interviewed by Human
Rights Watch researchers was able to do so.”46 On the other side of the debate, however,
were people such as Rwanda’s Prosecutor General Martin Ngoga, who strongly defended
the law and stressed that many European countries had similar laws on their books.47 In
spite of the international criticism, the laws were positively received in the progovernment Rwandan press.48
¶16
Several years later, Law No. 18/2008 Relating to the Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide Ideology was introduced.49 It defines “genocide ideology” in article 2 as “an
aggregate of thoughts characterized by conduct, speeches, documents and other acts
aiming at exterminating or inciting others to exterminate people basing on ethnic group,
origin, nationality, region, colour, physical appearance, sex, language, religion or
political opinion, committed in normal periods or during war.”50 Article 3 outlines what
type of behavior “characterises” the crime of genocide ideology:
1. threatening, intimidating, degrading through defamatory speeches,
documents or actions which aim at propounding wickedness or inciting
hatred;
2. marginalising, laughing at one’s misfortune, defaming, mocking, boasting,
despising, degrading, creating confusion aiming at negating the genocide
which occurred, stirring up ill feelings, taking revenge, altering testimony
or evidence for the genocide which occurred;
3. killing, planning to kill or attempting to kill someone for purposes of
furthering genocide ideology.51

Safer to Stay Silent, supra note 15, at 18.
Id.
46 Id.; Human Rights Watch Report, supra note 35.
47 Martin Ngoga, Why Rwanda Needs the Law Repressing Genocide Ideology, Umuvugizi (June 4, 2011),
http://www.http://umuvugizi.wordpress.com/2011/06/04/why-rwanda-needs-the-law-repressing-genocidedenial-and-ideology/. Zachary Pall has written on this point, contrasting the much more restrained use of
parallel legislation in Germany with the scale of prosecutions seen in Rwanda. Zachary Pall, Light Shining
Darkly: Comparing Post-Conflict Constitutional Structures Concerning Speech and Association in
Germany and Rwanda, 42 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 5 (2011).
48 See, e.g., Ignatius Ssuuna & James Buyinza, New Law to Fight Genocide Ideology, The New Times
(Mar. 23, 2008), http://www.newtimes.co.rw/news/index.php?i=13478&a=1021.
49 The 2003 Law, supra note 7.
50 Id. art. 2.
51 Id. art. 3.
44
45
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These broadly defined activities could lead to imprisonment of anywhere between
10 and 25 years and there is a considerable fine as well.52 If the “genocide ideology” was
spread “through documents, speeches, pictures, media or any other means,” the minimum
penalty starts at 20 years, going up to 25.53 In other words, genocide ideology committed
by the media or politicians incurs heavier punishment as a matter of course.
¶18
This law, like the 2003 Law, was very critically received. Amnesty International
reported “[t]he [2008] law constitutes an impermissible restriction on freedom of
expression under international law,” warning that the law “criminalizes dissenting
voices” and has been used against leaders of opposition political parties.54 The report also
documented cases where the law was used to settle personal vendettas, including by
students to discredit teachers and by individuals to gain the upper hand in property
disputes.55 Human Rights Watch expressed similar concerns, citing interviews with jurists
who asserted that the law was frequently used to serve political and personal interests.56
A high-profile example of this practice is the prosecution of Victoire Ingabire. Returning
to Rwanda from exile after 16 years, she had hoped to stand against President Kagame in
the 2010 elections. However, shortly after she set foot in the country, Ms. Ingabire was
criminally prosecuted for, amongst other things, genocide ideology charges under the
2008 Law. The charges were based on her call for the prosecution of war crimes
committed by RPF members during the 1994 genocide. Her party was refused
registration, which made it impossible to participate in the elections. Ultimately, Kagame
went on to obtain 93.08% of the vote.57
¶19
Though the 2003 and 2008 laws were enacted consecutively, there are good
arguments to consider them as interconnected. Both laws—together with the
Constitution—try to grapple with the genocide legacy by creating a framework in which
a repeat of the events of 1994 can be prevented and the memory of the genocide is dealt
with in a respectful manner. The 2003 and 2008 Law have both sought to clarify the
mandate set in the Constitution, with the 2008 Law trying to fill the gaps left by the 2003
Law. The April 2012 judgment of the Rwandan Supreme Court also makes a link
between the 2003 and 2008 laws, as will be discussed in the following Section.
¶20
A more disconcerting feature that the 2003 and 2008 laws and the Constitution
share is a clear lack of specificity: it is manifestly unclear on the face of the text of the
laws what type of behavior does and does not fall within their scope. As will be discussed
in Section IV, the almost unfettered discretion this leaves for the State to prosecute under
these laws is in clear violation of Rwanda’s obligation under international law. René
Lemarchand, a French US-based political scientist who is known for his research on
ethnic conflict and genocide in Rwanda, Burundi, and Darfur, has said of the 2003 Law,
“So vague and all-embracing is the language of the law as to give the courts
Id. art. 4.
Id. art. 8 (Penalties for disseminating genocide ideology: any person who disseminates genocide
ideology in public through documents, speeches, pictures, media or any other means shall be sentenced to
an imprisonment from twenty (20) years to twenty-five (25) years and a fine of two million (2.000.000) to
five million (5.000.000) Rwandan francs.).
54 Safer to Stay Silent, supra note 15, at 20.
55 Id. at 24.
56 Human Rights Watch Report, supra note 35, at 40.
57 Election Data, National Electoral Commission of Rwanda,
http://www.nec.gov.rw/detials/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=49&cHash=7990f6c09f43eeeafb70dcb38a2dbd56.
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extraordinary latitude to indict suspects on the flimsiest grounds.”58 The use of “genocide
denial” charges even before the relevant laws were enacted59 to prosecute and jail an
alarmingly large number of people60 makes it difficult not to draw the conclusion that this
concern is justified and that these laws are sometimes used to serve an entirely different
agenda than officially suggested.
III. THE CASES AGAINST AGNÈS UWIMANA-NKUSI AND SAIDATI MUKAKIBIBI
A. The Case at First Instance
¶21

Agnès Uwimana-Nkusi and Saidati Mukakibibi were arrested in July 2010. They
both wrote for the biweekly publication Umurabyo, a Kinyarwanda-language newspaper
with a circulation estimated at 100-150 copies per issue, of which Ms. Uwimana-Nkusi
also was the editor. In the course of 2010, Ms. Uwimana-Nkusi and Ms. Mukakibibi had
published a number of articles raising critical questions about, amongst other things, the
government’s agricultural policies, its handling of corruption by high-ranking
government officials, and human rights violations in the country. Prior to her arrest and
detention in 2010, Ms. Uwimana-Nkusi had been imprisoned in 2007 for publishing
material critical of the government.61 In that year, she was still working for Umuseso, a
Kinyarwanda-language weekly newspaper. Underlying her 2007 conviction was the
publication of an anonymous letter that had allegedly been written by a former member
of the RPF.62 Without the assistance of legal counsel, Ms. Uwimana-Nkusi pled guilty to
charges of defamation and divisionism. In exchange for this plea bargain she served one
year in prison instead of five.63 She was released in January 2008.64
¶22
In early July 2010, Ms. Uwimana-Nkusi was arrested without warning, when she
was on her way to visit family members.65 When hearing about the arrest one day later,
Ms. Mukakibibi went to the police station in Kigali to offer assistance. When she arrived
at the station, she was arrested on the spot.66 Both journalists were held for a week
without being informed of the charges against them.67 Another Umurabyo contributor,
René Lemarchand, Genocide, Memory and Ethnic Reconciliation in Rwanda 25 (2006),
http://www.ua.ac.be/objs/00178894.pdf.
59 These charges are in violation of Rwanda’s Constitution. The Constitution, supra note 7, art. 20 (Nobody
shall be punished for acts or omissions that did not constitute an offence under national or international law
at the time of commission or omission. Neither shall any person be punished with a penalty which is
heavier than the one that was applicable under the law at the time when the offence was committed.).
60 See Safer to Stay Silent, supra note 15, for a discussion of the number of cases.
61 In Rwanda, Newspaper Director Jailed for Publishing Critical Letter, Comm. to Protect Journalists (Jan.
16, 2007), http://cpj.org/2007/01/in-rwanda-newspaper-director-jailed-for-publishing.php.
62 Id.
63 In Rwanda, Publication of a Letter Draws a Prison Term, Comm. to Protect Journalists (Apr. 20, 2007),
http://cpj.org/2007/04/in-rwanda-publication-of-a-letter-draws-a-prison-t.php; Newspaper Editor Freed
After She Completes One-year Prison Sentence, Reporters Without Borders (Jan. 1, 2008),
http://archives.rsf.org/print.php3?id_article=25133.
64 Id.
65 This information was conveyed to the author through personal conversations with Ms. Uwimana-Nkusi
and Ms. Mukakibibi.
66 See text accompanying footnote 66.
67 See text accompanying footnote 66.
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who was a graphic designer, was initially arrested as well in connection with an image
that appeared with one of the articles for which the other two journalists had been
arrested, portraying President Kagame with a large swastika looming over him.68 He was
released after explaining that the image in question had not been manipulated in any way:
the photo had in fact been taken during a visit by President Kagame to Jerusalem’s
Holocaust History Museum at Yad Vashem in 2008.69
¶23
The journalists were denied bail twice due to the serious nature of the charges
against them70 and tried before the High Court of Kigali. Ms. Uwimana-Nkusi was
charged and convicted for four separate charges, on the basis of four articles she wrote
for Umurabyo: threatening national security (on grounds of article 166 of the Rwandan
Penal Code),71 genocide minimization (article 4 of the 2003 Law),72 defamation of the
President (article 391 of the Rwanda Penal Code),73 and divisionism (article 1 of the 2001
Law on Sectarianism).74 Ms. Mukakibibi was charged and convicted for threatening
national security on the basis of one article published in Umurabyo.75 She was acquitted
of the divisionism charge that had also been brought against her on the basis of the same
article.76
¶24
The conviction for genocide minimization was related to an article Ms. UwimanaNkusi had written for Issue Number 21 of Umurabyo, published in May 2010.77 In the
article, she described the division between ethnic groups within Rwandan society since
the distinction between Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa was introduced by the colonial power, and
the subsequent favoritism for a different group by each presidential administration. Ms.
Uwimana-Nkusi pointed out that there was not only “ethnicism” in the country, but also
“regionalism.” She then wrote that “Rwandans lived for a long time with this hatred until
they ended up killing each other after [former President] Kinani [Habyarimana]’s
death.”78
¶25
It was the “killing each other” wording that was considered as minimizing the
genocide. In its judgment, the High Court first discussed Ms. Uwimana-Nkusi’s defense.
She had argued that the Prosecution had not taken into account the full article and that her
words had to be understood in their proper context.79 Ms. Uwimana-Nkusi further
stressed that she had no intention of minimizing the genocide; rather, she fully
acknowledged it had taken place and had written as much in a number of articles
published in Umurabyo.80 The High Court alleged that Ms. Uwimana-Nkusi’s defense
Le Ministère Public v. Uwimana Nkusi and Mukakibibi, Case No. RP 0082/10/HC/KIG, ¶ 48 (High
Court of Rwanda, Jan. 4, 2011) (unpublished case on file with author) [hereinafter the High Court Case].
69 Id. (The graphic designer was released without charge and Ms. Uwimana-Nkusi was acquitted of this
charge by the High Court).
70 See text accompanying footnote 66.
71 Code Pénal du Rwanda [Penal Code], art. 166 (1977).
72 The 2003 Law, supra note 7.
73 Code Pénal du Rwanda [Penal Code], art. 391 (1977).
74 The 2001 Law, supra note 29.
75 Code Pénal du Rwanda [Penal Code], art. 166 (1977); Saidati Mukakibibi, King Kigeli is the Solution,
Umurabyo (Jul. 19, 2010).
76 The High Court Case, supra note 68, ¶¶ 72-77.
77 Agnès Uwimana-Nkusi, Kagame in Difficult Times, Umurabyo (May 15, 2010).
78 Id.
79 The High Court Case, supra note 68, at ¶ 43.
80 Id.
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was that her article intended to show that when the Tutsi were attacked, they fought back
to defend themselves, “leading to both sides engaging in fighting and killing.”81 The High
Court disagreed with this point of view and stated:
¶26
Uwimana-Nkusi Agnes claims that hatred between Rwandans grew, which led to
them killing each other. The High Court has found that here she has shown that it was
hatred that caused the killings, and this is not true as there was an intention of
exterminating the Tutsis. The defendant intentionally minimises the genocide in her
article, since before the Court she admitted that genocide took place against the Tutsis
and that killings did not occur from both sides.82
¶27
After citing the judgment of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
(“ICTR”) in the Media Trial83 to illustrate what was intended by “the crime of
genocide”—namely, “committing atrocities against Tutsis with the intent to exterminate
them”84—the Court found Ms. Uwimana-Nkusi guilty of genocide minimization, adding
to its motives to do so that “she knew that, on publishing the article, it would reach many
Rwandans, as her newspaper Umurabyo is published biweekly.”85 The fact that
circulation of the newspaper was only around 100 to 150 per edition was not mentioned
by the Court.
¶28
For the genocide minimization charge, Ms. Uwimana-Nkusi was convicted to 10
years’ imprisonment and a fine. She further received a five-year prison sentence for
threatening national security, a one-year sentence and a fine for divisionism, and a oneyear sentence for defaming the President.86 In total, she was sentenced to 17 years of
imprisonment, to be served consecutively.87 Ms. Mukakibibi received a sentence of seven
years of imprisonment for having threatened national security.88
B. The April 2012 Supreme Court Ruling
¶29

An appeal was lodged with the Supreme Court of Rwanda, which heard the case on
January 30 and 31, 2012. The case received wide attention from both the national and
international media and various NGOs.89 The journalists were represented in court by an
international team of lawyers, who argued points of Rwandan law as well as comparative

Id.
Id. ¶ 44.
83 See Prosecutor v. Nahima, Barayagwiza, & Ngeze, supra note 26.
84 The High Court Case, supra note 68, ¶ 45.
85 Id.
86 Id. ¶ 85.
87 Id. The Court saw no reason to hand down a lighter penalty due to Ms. Uwimana-Nkusi’s ill health or the
fact that the Media High Council which also brought proceedings against her had come to a settlement with
her. Id. ¶¶ 79-84.
88 Id. ¶ 90.
89 See, e.g., Rwanda Journalists Jailed for Genocide Denial Launch Supreme Court Appeal, The Guardian
(Jan. 29, 2012), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/jan/29/rwanda-journalists-genocide-denial-appeal;
Procès en appel de Deux Journalistes Condamnées pour Avoir Nié le Genocide, RFI (Jan. 30, 2012),
http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20120130-proces-appel-deux-journalistes-condamnees-avoir-nie-le-genocide;
Jailed Rwanda Journalists’ Prison Terms Cut, Associated Free Press (Apr. 5, 2012),
http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5i5kUIbrZWI-cs1LB4d2SSurPVyQ?docId=CNG.ece3e53648ded978749d9b29e939c905.4f1. In a landmark decision, the court allowed
amicus curiae submissions from Article 19 and Avocats Sans Frontières.
81
82
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law standards from the region, generally accepted norms of international criminal law,
and international human rights law.
¶30
When considering the appeal against the genocide minimization conviction, the
Supreme Court in its judgment first focused on the meaning of the Kinyarwanda word
“gutemagurana”. According to Ms. Uwimana-Nkusi, the term should be read as meaning
“killing each other with machetes.” The Prosecution, however, insisted that the term
implied that a “civil war” had occurred, rather than genocide.90 The Court first quoted
article 4 of the 2003 Law91 and then continued:
This article does not explain clearly the acts constituting the crime of
genocide minimisation. It only shows the denial of genocide can be
punished when it is made public either through speech, writing, image or
photo or any other way. The Supreme Court has never taken a decision in
a trial explaining what it means to minimise the genocide. The Rwandan
dictionary also does not give an explanation of what is ‘the minimisation
of genocide.’92
¶31

The Court then reflected on the concept of genocide minimization, present in both
the 2003 Law and the 2008 Law:
However, in the current language of Kinyarwanda ‘gupfobya’ means
giving something minimal worth it does not deserve. This idea is
developed in the law project on the criminalisation of genocide ideology
in which it says: ‘The minimisation of genocide is any behaviour exhibited
publicly and intentionally in order to reduce the weight or consequences of
the genocide against Tutsis, minimise how the genocide was committed,
alter the truth about the genocide against the Tutsis in order to hide the
truth from the people; asserting that there were two genocides in Rwanda:
one committed against the Tutsis and the other against Hutus.93

¶32

The Court then turned towards the Holocaust, and cited examples of instances
where asserting that there had been acts of mutual killing in that context was considered
genocide denial.94 According to the Supreme Court, this was what the Prosecution relied
upon when bringing the charge in question against Ms. Uwimana-Nkusi and, according to
the Court, it had been right in doing so:
On this, the court finds that the Prosecution is correct in stating that
presenting the genocide against Tutsis as an act of ‘gutemagurana’
between Rwandans is an act of genocide minimisation, because the word
‘gutemagurana’ minimises the horrible programme that the government
had in place in 1994 to definitively exterminate Tutsis in Rwanda. In fact,
The 2012 Judgment, supra note 11, ¶¶ 43-46.
The 2003 Law, supra note 7.
92 The 2012 Judgment, supra note 11, ¶ 48.
93 Id. ¶ 48.
94 Id. ¶ 49.
90
91
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the genocide in Rwanda against Tutsis in 1994 does not merit generating
discussion in Rwanda particularly given that this is no longer a subject of
debate at the international level since the International Criminal Tribunal
for Rwanda (ICTR) has made a decision on various cases.95
¶33

While the Court found that the use of the word “gutemagurana” in effect minimized
the genocide, it continued by stating that, in using it, Ms. Uwimana-Nkusi needed to have
intended it as such:
[F]or the crime of genocide minimisation like all other crimes, a person
may be convicted for the crime when it is proven that he intended to
commit it; this means that by using the word ‘gutemagurana’, she intended
to say that the genocide committed against Tutsis has not occurred, that
there were no acts to exterminate the Tutsis, that rather Rwandans of all
ethnicities were killing each other with each ethnic group having the
intention of eliminating the other.96

¶34

Looking at the article in question, as well as others written by Ms. Uwimana-Nkusi,
the Supreme Court came to the conclusion that such intent was absent. It cited
extensively from these other publications, which referred to the genocide as the killing of
Tutsis as intended by the regime.97 Finally, the Court concluded its considerations as
follows:
[T]he Supreme Court finds that the use of the word ‘gutemagurana’ in the
sense of the genocide committed against Tutsis is effectively a proposition
that minimises the genocide. The use of this word is like so many others
often used inappropriately to justify the genocide committed against
Tutsis, notably the following statements: this happened during the war, the
tragedy known in Rwanda, sectarian conflict . . . are about the
minimisation of the genocide that people should avoid using as they can in
the future grow to devalue the genocide against Tutsis. However, what the
use of this terminology may be, in order for those who used it to be
punishable under Article 33bis/2003 Law of the law against genocide,
crimes against humanity and war crimes, there must be evidence proving
that he who committed it recognises and had the intention to convince
others that he does not acknowledge the genocide committed against
Tutsis. Having said that, Uwimana-Nkusi Agnes did not have this
intention as has been explained. The court therefore acquits her on this
count.98

¶35

The Supreme Court judgment points to what has been described as the “one truth”
concept: only a certain version of events can be considered as “true” when it comes to the
Id. ¶ 50.
Id. ¶ 51.
97 Id. ¶¶ 52-55.
98 Id. ¶ 56.
95
96
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genocide.99 The Court’s findings unfortunately leave important points unresolved. While
the Court starts by acknowledging that the 2003 Law is unclear in defining the exact
meaning of genocide minimization, the Court then fails to clarify the law’s meaning in
even general terms, even though the Court itself points out this lacuna in its case law so
far. This was a missed opportunity to better shape the contours of a legal concept that is
highly opaque.
¶36
The Court does make clear that there has to be intent on the part of the accused, and
the decision in Ms. Uwimana-Nkusi’s case seems to imply that even the use of “wrong”
terminology can fall outside the realm of the 2003 Law. Given the link the Supreme
Court makes in its judgment between the 2003 and 2008 Law by discussing the concept
of genocide minimization, which is present in both laws, in general terms, this arguably
applies to the 2008 Law as well. The Court’s considerations on this point would also be
in conformity with the generally recognized legal principle requiring mens rea for
criminal liability.100
¶37
So while the Supreme Court’s reasoning is not very clear overall, it does provide
guidance on two points. First, the Court’s judgment is an authoritative statement that
acknowledges that the concept of genocide minimization, and in particular the wording of
the 2003 Law, lacks precision. Second, the Court clearly stated that intent has to be
proven to find someone guilty of genocide minimization. A less explicit point the
judgment makes, which is implied by the Court’s considerations and supported by the
legislative history of the laws,101 is that the 2003 and 2008 laws are interlinked. Arguably,
the Supreme Court’s findings on lack of specificity in the 2003 Law as well as the
necessity for the element of intent to establish culpability stretch to the 2008 Law as well.
The recently adopted changes to the 2008 Law appear to support this (see Section V).
¶38
The Supreme Court judgment resulted in an acquittal for Ms. Uwimana-Nkusi on
the charges of genocide minimization and divisionism102 and a reduction of her sentence
for threatening national security from five to three years.103 Her conviction for defaming
the President remained standing.104 In total, Ms. Uwimana-Nkusi was left with four years
to serve instead of 17, with a deduction of time served. Ms. Mukakibibi’s sentence was
reduced from seven to three years; the Court found that, since both journalists were
Human Rights Watch Report, supra note 35, at 36.
The Supreme Court came to similar conclusions in the case against Deo Mushayidi. Mr. Mushayidi was
the former head of the Association of Rwandan Journalists (ARJ) and Chairman of the Pact for People's
Defence (PDP), a political party that was founded in Belgium and was active with Rwandans living abroad.
After co-authoring a book, Secrets du Génocide Rwandais - Enquête Sur Les Mystères d'un Président" (The
Secrets of the Rwandan Genocide - Investigation of the Mysteries of a President), he was accused of
genocide revisionism and ideology. In September 2010, the High Court found Mr. Mushayidi guilty of
threatening state security through means of war, spreading propaganda and using a forged passport. He
was, however acquitted of promoting genocide revisionism because the element of intent was missing. See
Le Ministère Public v. Mushayidi, Case No. 0040/10/HC/KIG (H.C. Sept. 17, 2010),
http://www.judiciary.gov.rw/uploads/tx_publications/Microsoft_Word_-_MUSHAYIDI_Deo_Last.pdf.
The Supreme Court upheld the High Court’s decision in February 2012. See Le Ministère Public v.
Mushayidi, Case No. 0298/10/CS (S.C. Feb. 28, 2012),
http://www.judiciary.gov.rw/en/cases/judgements/?subcat=153.
101 See Section II supra.
102 The 2012 Judgment, supra note 11, ¶¶ 57-67.
103 Id. ¶ 77
104 Id. ¶ 78.
99
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charged for the same crime in the same trial, namely threatening national security under
article 166 of the Penal Code, each should receive the same penalty.105 Ms. Mukakibibi’s
remaining term was also reduced by time served.106 Ms. Mukakibibi was released in June
2013, while Ms. Uwimana-Nkusi’s release is scheduled for the summer of 2014.
¶39
The journalists have since appealed to the African Commission on Human and
Peoples’ Rights, arguing a violation of their fair trial rights and challenging the
convictions upheld by the Supreme Court, which they contend violate their right to
freedom of expression.107
IV. THE SHORTCOMINGS OF THE GENOCIDE DENIAL LAWS AND THE SUPREME COURT
RULING
¶40

As discussed in the previous section, the Supreme Court’s April 2012 judgment
showed that the concept of “genocide minimisation” under Rwandan law is not clear. It
also confirmed that the judiciary had not yet clarified the concept and that the Supreme
Court refrained from filling this void. The judgment also made clear that mere use of
certain words or terminology could be considered a constitutive element of the offense.
However, in order to qualify as a crime under the 2003 Law, the element of intent was
required to find someone guilty of having committed the act. This section will discuss the
shortcomings of the genocide denial laws, as confirmed by the Supreme Court ruling and
as measured by the standard of Rwanda’s obligations under international law. Section V
will discuss the options for remedying these shortcomings, after which the developments
after the 2012 Supreme Court decision will be highlighted in Section VI.
¶41
As previously mentioned, the reasoning of the Supreme Court is not entirely clear
and leaves some important questions unanswered. However, the Court’s statement that
the genocide minimization concept lacks precision and the emphasis it placed on the
element of intent are significant findings that can be taken as markers for the manner in
which the genocide denial laws should be applied. It also raises the question of whether
the laws’ continued existence in their current form is sustainable.
¶42
The lack of precision of the genocide denial laws, as confirmed by the Supreme
Court judgment, is relevant to the obligations regarding freedom of expression that
Rwanda has under its own Constitution. It is also linked to the obligations Rwanda incurs
under the international human rights treaties it has ratified, upon which the Constitution
confers supremacy over Rwanda’s national laws. The most relevant treaties in this regard
are the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (the “African Charter”)108 and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (the “ICCPR”).109
¶43
The Rwandan Constitution guarantees the right to freedom of expression in articles
33 and 34:

Code Pénal du Rwanda [Penal Code], art. 166 (1977).
The 2012 Judgment, supra note 11, ¶ 80.
107 African Comm’n on Hum. And Peoples’ Rts., Comm’n No. 426 (2012) (as yet unpublished since the
case is currently ongoing).
108 African Charter on Hum. and Peoples’ Rts., Jun. 27, 1981, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982) [hereinafter African
Charter].
109 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, S. Treaty Doc. No. 95-20, 6 I.L.M.
368 (1967), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
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Article 33
Freedom of thought, opinion, conscience, religion, worship and the
public manifestation thereof is guaranteed by the State in accordance with
conditions determined by law.
Propagation of ethnic, regional, racial or discrimination or any
other form of division is punishable by law.
Article 34
Freedom of the press and freedom of information are recognized
and guaranteed by the State.
Freedom of speech and freedom of information shall not prejudice
public order and good morals, the right of every citizen to honour, good
reputation and the privacy of personal and family life. It is also guaranteed
so long as it does not prejudice the protection of the youth and minors.
The conditions for exercising such freedoms are determined by
law.110
¶44

The second sentence of article 33, making the propagation of discrimination
punishable by law, can be considered an implementation of Rwanda’s obligation under
article 20 of the ICCPR,111 while the second and third sentences of article 34, protecting
public order, good morals, reputation, and privacy can be taken as an enactment of the
restrictions to free expression allowed under article 19(3) ICCPR.112 These permissible
restrictions on the right to free expression will be discussed below.
¶45
In the Preamble of its Constitution, Rwanda reaffirms its adherence to the
principles enshrined in the international treaties it is party to.113 These include the African
Charter and the ICCPR, both of which protect free expression. Expression, clearly, is
what the genocide denial laws try to regulate. In Title X of the Constitution, which deals
with international treaties and agreements, the supremacy of these treaties over Rwanda’s
own organic laws is codified in article 190:
Article 190
Upon their publication in the official gazette, international treaties
and agreements which have been conclusively adopted in accordance with
the provisions of law shall be more binding than organic laws and ordinary
laws except in the case of non compliance by one of parties.114
¶46

The implication of this constitutional provision is that Rwanda should adhere to the
protection the African Charter and the ICCPR offer to free expression. Article 19 of the
ICCPR clearly sets out the conditions under which free expression may be limited. These
The Constitution, supra note 7, arts. 33, 34.
“1. Any propaganda for war shall be prohibited by law. 2. Any advocacy of national, racial or religious
hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law.”
ICCPR, supra note 110, art. 20.
112 “1. Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference.” ICCPR, supra note 110, art. 19.
113 “(b) For the protection of national security or of public order (ordre public), or of public health or
morals.” The Constitution, supra note 4, Preamble.
114 Id. art. 190.
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conditions are equally applicable under article 9 of the African Charter.115 Limitations to
the right to freedom of expression are only permitted if they are 1) prescribed by law; 2)
necessary in a democratic society; and 3) serve a legitimate aim, which can be the
protection of public morals, reputation, or national security. All three conditions have to
be met or a limitation on free expression is not allowed. It is also important to mention in
this context that articles 19(3) and 20 of the ICCPR, the latter of which places an
obligation upon States Parties to proscribe hate speech in national legislation, are
complementary.116 Article 20 legislation should still meet the three-part test under article
19(3).117
¶47
The requirement that a restriction of free expression should be “prescribed by law”
means that, first of all, there has to be legislation concerning the restriction, and second,
that the law in question must have a sufficient level of precision. It should be sufficiently
clear and precise to allow an individual to regulate his or her behavior; in other words it
must be clear what is and is not allowed under the law.118
¶48
As shown in the discussion of the laws above in Section II, and as was confirmed
by the Rwandan Supreme Court in its April 2012 ruling (Section III), the concept of
“genocide minimisation” lacks the requisite level of precision. This is not to say that
genocide denial laws as such cannot conform to the obligations set forth in article 19
ICCPR,119 but rather that the laws must be drafted with appropriate clarity. If no one, not
even the supreme judicial body in the country, can determine what exactly constitutes the
offense, the conclusion is easily drawn that the genocide denial laws do not meet the
“prescribed by law” criterion. This means that they constitute an impermissible restriction
of free expression under the African Charter, the ICCPR, and also Rwanda’s
Constitution.
V. POSSIBLE SCENARIOS TO ADDRESS THE GENOCIDE DENIAL LAWS’ SHORTCOMINGS
¶49

What are the options of moving forward with a law that is flawed, or, in fact,
incompatible with a country’s obligations under international law? The most obvious and
solid remedy would be law reform, a revision of the law to bring it in accordance with the
parameters of article 19(3) of the ICCPR as defined in the treaty itself and further refined
in the case law of the U.N. Human Rights Committee.120
Like the ICCPR, the African Charter allows for limitations on expression only when certain conditions
have been met. Resolution 62 of the African Union states these conditions as follows: “[a]ny restrictions on
freedom of expression shall be provided by law, serve a legitimate interest and be necessary and in a
democratic society.” African Comm’n, Res. 62, 32nd Sess., § II(2) (Oct. 17-23, 2002),
http://www.achpr.org/sessions/32nd/resolutions/62/.
116 Hum. Rts. Comm., General Comment No. 34, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/34 (Sept. 12, 2011). See, e.g.,
U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., J. R. T. and the W. G. Party v. Canada, Comm. No. 104/1981, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/OP/2 at 25 (July 18, 1981).
117 General Comment No. 34, supra note 116, ¶ 50.
118 Id. ¶ 25.
119 For a discussion of how French genocide denial laws, and denial laws more generally, can be consistent
with the aim of preserving democracy, see Sevane Garibian, Taking Denial Seriously, 9 Cardozo J. Conflict
Resol. 479 (2008).
120 For arguments that no genocide denial law should be found consistent with the right to freedom of
expression, see Noam Chomsky, Preface: Some Elementary Comments on The Rights of Freedom of
Expression, in Robert Faurisson, Mémoire en Défense (1980).
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¶50

A process of reform for the genocide denial laws was formally announced in
2010. In 2012 and 2013, two new laws were adopted to replace the 2003 and 2008
laws.
¶51
On June 14, 2012, a new Penal Code was adopted,122 which included article 116 on
“punishment of the crime of negationism and minimisation of the genocide against the
Tutsi.”123 The text is practically identical to the provision on genocide minimization in
the 2003 Law, except that it reduces the applicable penalty:
121

Any person who publicly shows, by his/her words, writings, images, or by
any other means, that he/she negates the genocide against the Tutsi, rudely
minimizes it or attempts to justify or approve its grounds, or any person
who hides or destroys its evidence shall be liable to a term of
imprisonment of more than five (5) years to nine (9) years.
If the crimes under paragraph one of this Article are committed by an
association or a political organisation, its dissolution shall be
pronounced.124
¶52

So, while the new Penal Code reduces the possible prison sentence for genocide
minimization from somewhere between 10 and 20 years to a sentence of five to nine
years, the text of the provision remains the same, including the shortcomings discussed in
Section II.
¶53
The law replacing the 2008 Law was finally passed by a joint National Assembly
and Senate committee on August 13, 2013, after draft bills languished in the legislature
for several years (the “2013 Law”).125 While the reforms offered in the 2013 revision can
be considered as a positive development, the law leaves much to be desired.
¶54
The 2013 Law adds two elements to the offense of “negation of genocide”: the act
must be in public and the act must be deliberate.126 Both elements appear at first to be
improvements over the 2008 Law, which allows for prosecution of comments made in
private and lacks statutory language regarding intent. However, the 2013 Law in its
current form defines “public acts” as any act that occurs in “a place accessible” by two or
more people, offering little in the way of change.127
¶55
Also a matter of concern is the fact that the requirement in the text of the 2013 Law
that an act must be “deliberate” is anything but clear. Article 5 requires that an act
negating the genocide must be deliberate. The act of genocide denial is defined there as
follows:
Negation of genocide shall be any deliberate act, committed in
public, aimed at:
The National Law Reform Commission, tasked with reviewing a number of Rwandan laws, was
established by Law No. 01/2010/OL of 09/6/2010.
122 Law No. 01/2012/OL, Instituting the Penal Code, Official Gazette of Rwanda, Jun. 14, 2012.
123 Code Pénal du Rwanda [Penal Code], art. 116 (2012).
124 Id.
125 Law No. 84/2013, Law on the Crime of Genocide Ideology and Other Related Offenses, Official
Gazette of Rwanda, Sept. 9, 2013.
126 Id. art. 5.
127 Id. art. 2(4).
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1. stating or explaining that genocide is not genocide;
2. deliberately misconstruing the facts about genocide for the purpose of
misleading the public;
3. supporting a double genocide theory for Rwanda;
4. stating or explaining that genocide against the Tutsi was not planned.

Any person who commits an act defined by the preceding
paragraph commits an offence of negation of genocide.128
¶56

A deliberate act is also required for “minimising” the genocide129 as well as
“justifying” the genocide.130 However, what minimization exactly entails is all but clear.
Article 6 of the 2013 Law states that anyone who “downplays the gravity or
consequences of genocide” or “the methods through which genocide was committed’ is
guilty of minimization.131 The precise elements of the crime remain undefined.
¶57
“Deliberate” is defined in article 2 as “willingly and with a desire to promote
genocide ideology.”132 As such, the intent requirement ostensibly forces prosecutors to
prove an act of negationism was committed with the intention of promoting genocide
ideology. However, the only definition of “genocide ideology” given is as follows:
Genocide ideology is any intentional act, done in public whether
by oral, written or video means or by another means and through which
may show that a person is characterized by ethnic, religious, nationality or
racial-based with the aim to:
1. advocate for the commission of genocide;
2. support the genocide.133
¶58

Ostensibly, genocide ideology is an element of negationism under the 2013 Law.
However, what constitutes genocide ideology remains elusive. Language such as “may
show that a person is characterized by ethnic, religious, nationality, or racial-based”
thought is vague,134 leaving unturned concerns regarding prosecutorial discretion and
abuse. Furthermore, if negationism has as an element the willing advancement of
genocide ideology, it is unclear what differentiates crimes under article 5’s “negationism”
from “genocide ideology” as proscribed by article 3.
¶59
The law reform process indicates that the Government of Rwanda considers reform
of its genocide denial laws necessary. However, in their current form, the laws still fall
short of the requisite standards under international law, as described above. Considering
that the Supreme Court also confirmed that there is need for more clarity on the matter, it
Id. art. 5.
Id. art. 6.
130 Id. art. 7.
131 Id. art. 6.
132 Id. art. 2(5).
133 Id. art. 3.
134 In a draft version of the law the sentence read “. . . nationality or racial-based thought,” but the word
“thought” was omitted from the English translation in the final publication. The French version, however,
still refers to “des pensées basées sur l’ethnie, la religion, la nationalité ou la race”.
128
129
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might be opportune to implement interim measures to bridge the period until the
necessary law reform has actually unfolded. This would prevent unjustified prosecutions
and convictions under faulty laws. One option would be for the Minister of Justice and
the Prosecutor General to issue prosecutorial guidelines, as allowed under articles 161
and 162 of the Constitution.135 These guidelines could, for example, instruct Public
Prosecutors to take heed of the Supreme Court’s findings as well as Rwanda’s obligations
under article 19(3) of the ICCPR. By pointing out to the corps of Prosecutors that the
genocide denial laws are formulated too broadly and informing them of the Supreme
Court’s guidance on the required element of intent, more careful decisions on prosecution
can be taken.
¶60
Similar measures could be taken on the other side of the Bar, by issuing judicial
guidelines, which would instruct lower courts to interpret and apply the laws in
accordance with the Supreme Court’s findings. Guidance could be offered by the High
Council of the Judiciary through its General Assembly under Organic Law No.
06/2012/OL of 14/09/2012 Determining the Organisation, Functioning and Jurisdiction of
Commercial Courts.136
¶61
Finally, the Supreme Court itself could set clearer standards through its decisions.
Under the Constitution, the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction extends to “coordinating and
supervising [lower courts’] activities,”137 as well as to the interpretation of customary law
where “the written law is silent.”138 However, this “legislating from the bench” has
downsides. First, the Constitution does not expressly afford the Court the power to
constructively interpret statutes that are otherwise constitutional. Additionally, the April
2012 ruling’s inconsistent influence on subsequent prosecutorial and judicial behavior
seems to indicate that the Supreme Court’s decisions, at least in this area, lack efficacy on
the ground. Finally, judge-made law runs the risk of being viewed as illegitimate. The
fear that judges have inserted their own worldview and politics into a controversial piece
of legislation, a phenomenon referred to derisively in the United States as “judicial
activism,” could reduce the esteem of the Court and upset the constitutional balance of
powers.139
VI. DEVELOPMENTS SINCE THE APRIL 2012 SUPREME COURT RULING
¶62

It is relatively difficult for non-Kinyarwanda speakers to assess prosecutorial and
judicial practice in Rwanda in full, since the case law in the country is mainly in
Kinyarwanda. However, a number of internationally reported cases appear to indicate
that the April 2012 Supreme Court guidance has not been followed.140 The issuance of
The Constitution, supra note 4, arts. 161, 162.
Law No. 06/2012, Organic Law Determining the Organisation, Functioning and Jurisdiction of
Commercial Courts, art. 14, Official Gazette of Rwanda, Sept. 14, 2012.
137 The Constitution, supra note 4, art. 145(2).
138 The Constitution, supra note 4, art. 145(13).
139 For a discussion of the term, see Keenan Kmiec, The Origin and Current Meanings of "Judicial
Activism", 92 Calif. L. Rev. 1441 (2004).
140 One case that demonstrates the lack of deference given to the April 2012 decision concerns radio
presenter Epaphrodite Habarugira, who was arrested in April 2012 in the district of Muhanga, Southern
Province. When reading the news about the genocide commemorations on the radio on April 22, 2012, Mr.
Habarugira inadvertently switched the Kinyarwanda word for “survivors” with the Kinyarwanda word for
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contradictory judicial decisions is therefore a point of concern and the Supreme Court
itself added to this concern in October 2012 with its ruling in the Victoire Ingabire case.
While the Court had been explicit about the shortcomings of the genocide denial laws in
its April 2012 ruling, it stopped short of declaring the provisions on genocide denial
unconstitutional six months later.
Ms. Ingabire returned to Rwanda from exile in January 2010, with the intention of
running against President Paul Kagame in the August elections of that year. However,
she was arrested in April 2010, released on bail, then re-arrested in October 2010 and
charged with terrorism,141 threatening national security,142 creating an armed group,143 and
discrimination and sectarianism.144 Another charge brought against her was that of
genocide ideology under articles 2 through 4 of the 2008 Law for having called for the
prosecution of wrongdoing by members of the RPF.145
On March 27, 2012, Ms. Ingabire lodged a constitutional challenge to the 2008
Law, requesting the Supreme Court to nullify articles 2 through 9 of the law.146 She
argued, inter alia, that articles 2 and 3 of the law contradicted articles 20, 33 and 34 of
the Constitution and were too broad in scope. In other words, she alleged that they did not
meet the provided by law requirement. The Supreme Court struck down the challenge on
October 18, 2012.147 While acknowledging that the law required more clarification, the
Court ruled that Ms. Ingabire’s arguments regarding articles 2 and 3 were baseless as the
law was “meaningful.”148
While this article is not intended to second-guess the Supreme Court’s ruling on
constitutionality in the Victoire Ingabire case or its motives for ruling as it did, the
Court’s decision is difficult to understand in light of the following.
One of the Supreme Court’s functions is to rule on the constitutionality of
Rwanda’s laws. As described above in Section II, Rwanda’s constitutional framework
and obligations under international law would argue against the genocide denial laws in
their current form: they are in contravention of Rwanda’s obligations under treaties it
ratified such as the African Charter and the ICCPR, which, according to the Constitution,
have supremacy over Rwanda’s regular laws. None of the treaties to which Rwanda is a
State Party prescribe legislation like the genocide denial laws, not even the 1948
“victims.” This slip of the tongue caused him to be prosecuted for genocide denial under articles 2, 3 and 8
of the 2008 Law. While the Court of First Instance acquitted him for lack of intent, the Prosecution has
appealed the acquittal. At time of writing, the appeal was slated for April 2014. MLDI has assisted in the
first instance defense and appeal of Mr. Habarugira.
141 Law No. 45/2008, Law on Counter Terrorism, arts. 21(3), 75, 76, Official Gazette of Rwanda, Sept. 9,
2008; Code Pénal du Rwanda [Penal Code ], arts. 21, 22, 24, 164 (2012).
142 Code Pénal du Rwanda [Penal Code], art. 166 (2012).
143 Id. art. 163.
144 The 2001 Law, supra note 29, arts. 3, 5.
145 Safer to Stay Silent, supra note 15.
146 The Constitution, supra note 7, arts. 145, 200.
147 The Ingabire Judgment, supra note 19.
148 Id.; Eric Didier Karinganire, Supreme Court Rejects Ingabire’s Petition, The Rwanda Focus (Oct. 18,
2012), http://focus.rw/wp/2012/10/supreme-court-rejects-ingabires-petition/. Having appealed her
conviction of an eight-year sentence, the Supreme Court in December 2013 extended Ms. Ingabire’s
sentence from eigth to 15 years. See Edmund Blair, Rwandan Court Extends Jail Term of Opposition
Politician, Reuters (Dec. 13, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/12/13/us-rwanda-oppositionidUSBRE9BC0KA20131213.
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Genocide Convention. As discussed above, the obligation under article 20 of the ICCPR
has to be read in conjunction with Rwanda’s obligations under article 19(3) of the
ICCPR. While, arguably, the Constitution also includes (broad and unspecified)
objectives regarding the prevention of genocide, these objectives can also be pursued
within a properly defined framework that is in compliance with international human
rights standards.
¶67
It is important to note, however, that the Supreme Court, even while refusing to
declare the 2008 Law unconstitutional, did concede in its ruling that the law required
clarification.149 In that sense, it confirmed its stance of April 2012. What now remains is a
situation in which on the one hand the genocide denial laws have been deemed
constitutional, while on the other hand it has been acknowledged that they fail to meet
essential legal standards under international law and the Constitution. The recent law
reforms failed to deal adequately with these shortcomings. In short, the one thing that is
clear is that the legal landscape on genocide denial is anything but transparent, with
obvious voids in the legislation which are yet to be filled by either proper legislation or
judicial interpretation.
VII. CONCLUSION
¶68

The Supreme Court’s April 2012 decision in the appeal of journalists Agnès
Uwimana-Nkusi and Saidati Mukakibibi made clear that Rwanda’s genocide denial laws
fail to meet the requisite standard of precision under international law. The Court stopped
short of clarifying this point itself, but did stress that the element of intent was essential
to finding anyone guilty of the offense. When presented with the opportunity to declare
one of the genocide denial laws unconstitutional in the context of the Victoire Ingabire
trial in October 2012, the Supreme Court declined to do so, but did confirm that the law
needed clarification.
¶69
The revisions to the 2003 and 2008 laws only partially address the shortcomings in
legislation, and may have created an even broader base for unwarranted prosecution. This
leaves Rwanda with laws on the books that do not comply with the international
standards it has signed on to and which also fail to offer the protection its own
Constitution gives to free expression. The situation is made more complex by a Supreme
Court that acknowledges that the genocide denial laws are flawed, but stops short of
providing comprehensive guidance on their interpretation or declaring the laws
unconstitutional. This is a situation prone to abuse, in which unjustified prosecutions can
easily take place.
¶70
Solid legislative reform, which would bring the genocide denial laws in line with
Rwanda’s obligations under public international law, would be the preferred remedy.
However, given the pace of the recent law reform projects, and taking into consideration
the shortcomings of the laws that were ultimately adopted, this may still be a long time
coming.
¶71
A good intermediate solution would be for the Rwandan government to
acknowledge that the current situation is not sustainable and to make sure that
prosecutorial and judicial guidelines are issued to encourage coherent legal interpretation
in accordance with Rwanda’s international obligations to protect human rights and
149

The Ingabire Judgment, supra note 19.

212

Vol. 12:2]

Yakaré-Oulé Jansen

prevent unjustified prosecutions and convictions. Another option is for the Supreme
Court to further clarify the laws’ weak points in its upcoming decisions. The alternative
would be to continue with the framework as it currently exists, which means that those
subject to Rwanda’s laws are at the mercy of individual decisions made within the
prosecutor’s office and inside judges’ chambers.
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